It was another bead in the string of jurisprudence and case law in climate litigation. Previous sparkling examples include Urgenda Foundation (2019), KlimaSeniorinnen (2024) and the significant Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice delivered in July 2025. The District Court of The Hague, in its January 28 judgment regarding the effects of climate change to the Caribbean island of Bonaire, ordered the Dutch State to not only comply with international emission reduction obligations but adopt and implement a plan to achieve such goals by 2030, in so doing taking into account the fate of Bonaire and its residents.
Bonaire is part of the Netherlands and one of three special municipalities in the Caribbean Netherlands. In 2024, Greenpeace, in a collective action with eight residents of Bonaire (the eight were subsequently denied standing), began legal proceedings against the Dutch State under the WAMCA (Wet afwikkeling massaschade collectieve actie) collective action regime, or the Settling of Large-scale Losses or Damage (Class Actions) Act.
The two fundamental questions at stake here was whether the State had taken sufficient timely and appropriate measures to protect the residents of Bonaire from the effects of climate change (the adaptation question); and whether the State’s climate policy was in conformity with equitable contributions to mitigation under the United Nations Climate Convention and the ensuing Paris Agreement to limit global warming to less than 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels by the end of the century.
The central contention of Greenpeace was that the protective treatment offered Bonair, be it terms of climate adaptation or mitigation, was insufficient and in breach of obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCPR). Furthermore, that insufficiency meant that the degree of protection offered the residents of Bonaire relative to those of the European Netherlands was inadequate, refusing to account for the rights of those in Bonaire to experience and practise their own culture.
The Dutch State argued in its submissions that the residents of Bonaire had received adequate measures in terms of protection. These were not fewer “but rather different measures that are specifically tailored to the situation in the Caribbean, which differs from that in the European Netherlands.” A running argument long used by State authorities in other climate change cases was cited: that it was up to legislators and governments, not courts and judges, to frame policies in terms of climate change mitigation. Besides, the Netherlands was “already doing more than many other countries and cannot be held solely responsible for the global problem of climate change.”
The Court found that the Dutch State had failed in its positive obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR, which protects rights to privacy and family life, as “the mitigation and adaptation measures as a whole taken by the competent authorities in relation to the inhabitants of Bonaire do not meet the obligations the State has assumed in a UN context.”
Those mitigation and adaptation measures had also been taken “much later and less systematically than for the inhabitants of the European Netherlands”, despite foreknowledge since the early 1990s that Bonaire would be more vulnerable to the effects of climate change earlier than the European Netherlands. (The Court took cognisance of Assessment Reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) addressing the specific vulnerabilities of small islands to climate change.)
In taking into account the relevant assessment framework, the judgment drew on the 2024 KlimaSeniorinnen ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, which showed the increasing willingness of judges to assess the means by which regulations and measures are implemented in addressing climate change. State discretion is not absolute, fettered by the need to take adequate mitigation measures, the adoption of timely and clear adaptation measures and the need for procedural safeguards.
The measures in question would need to, for instance, stipulate a specific target date for achieving carbon neutrality, including intermediate emissions reduction targets and pathways to meet emission reduction goals in a timely fashion. In KlimaSeniorinnen, Switzerland’s policies were rebuked on several grounds. “Critical lacunae” existed in implementing a regulatory framework, including, among other things, a failure to pass legislation indicating a clear pathway for emission reductions in the long term.
Overall, the Dutch State, on the issue of mitigation, had failed to demonstrate that its measures would be able to deliver the required emission reductions in a timely way. By way of example, there were no legislated targets across the economy beyond 2030, or “no concrete instruments aimed at achieving the reduction targets agreed within the UN context”. By the admission of the Dutch authorities, there was a “less than 5% chance” that it would achieve its 2030 targets. Failure to tighten the policy would also see 2050 targets unmet.
On adaptation, the State had also been remiss in providing “sufficient personnel, resources and specialist knowledge to counter those serious negative consequences.” By treating those in Bonaire differently to inhabitants in the European Netherlands in taking adaptation measures, despite the island’s greater susceptibility to harm and limited local means, the State was not only in breach of Article 8 but Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 12 (general prohibition of discrimination).
As regards the procedural element, which covers such matters as developing and implementing educational and public awareness programmes, providing the public access to information on climate change and its effects, enabling public participation in addressing such changes and developing adequate responses, and the training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel, the State also fell short. Nearly all efforts mentioned by the Dutch State took place after 2022. From 2023, “documents show that the State is catching up, with many necessary overdue measures still being taken and room being made for participation by and knowledge of residents and local organisations.” Citizens will, however, be hampered by the absence of “binding national standards and concrete policy instruments” that would improve their participation.
The judgment is also interesting for showing sceptics of international law’s standing and members of the might-is-right school that jurisprudence from such bodies as the ICJ has persuasive force in domestic courts. Reliance was placed by the Dutch Court on the 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinion, which proposed that “obligations of conduct and obligations of result” could see a State breach a relevant obligation. In terms of obligation, a State would act wrongfully in failing “to use all means at its disposal to bring about an objective”. In terms of an obligation of result, “policies so adopted and the measures so taken must be such as they are able to achieve the required goal.”
The Netherlands will be required, within eighteen months, to incorporate absolute emission reduction targets across the economy via legislation, “including intermediate targets and pathways for the reduction of carbon emissions for the entire period up to 2050”.
The implications of this decision are bound to leave their mark in ongoing and future climate litigation, revealing the increasingly influential, even intrusive role of the courts in assessing a State’s mitigation and, it now transpires, adaptation measures. The latitude governments have traditionally had in shaping these responses is shrinking before the judicial stare, and those States with overseas territories will be nervous about the prospect of a harrying lawsuit.
The post The Netherlands, Bonaire, and Climate Change Obligations appeared first on Dissident Voice.
This content originally appeared on Dissident Voice and was authored by Binoy Kampmark.